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appellee's children due to appellee's disability. If the SSI 
payments are credited, then the Court also needed to determine 
the amount of the offset for such payments. Finally, any amount 
of arrearage would then be deducted from the equity in the house 
owed to Mr. Coulon. 
B# Course of the Proceedings Below 
On June 24, 1994, respondent Mark Coulon filed an Order to 
Show Cause in the district court to collect from appellant, 
Tamara Coulon, respondent's share of the equity in the family 
home. On July 21, 1994, appellant filed a Counter-Order to Show 
Cause seeking an order of contempt against respondent for failing 
to pay child support, and seeking an offset against respondent's 
share of the equity in the home in the amount of the arrearage. 
After hearing oral argument on the matter, Commissioner 
Judith S. H. Atherton issued a Recommendation in the case by way 
of Minute Entry. See Minute Entry, Sept. 14, 1994. She 
recommended that the district court find that respondent was in 
arrears in the amount of twenty-eight thousand eight hundred 
dollars in his child support obligation, but that he was entitled 
to a credit of thirty-two thousand six hundred and twelve dollars 
toward that arrearage, for Supplemental Security Income payments 
equity in the home. 
On September 19, 1994, appellant filed an 
Objection/Rejection to the Commissioner's Recommendation, and the 
court scheduled oral argument. After hearing argument, Judge 
Frank G. Noel of the Third District Court issued his ruling in a 
Minute Entry dated April 6, 1995. In that ruling, Judge Noel 
agreed with the Commissioner's recommendation with regard to the 
amount respondent was currently in arrears, and additionally 
found that respondent had been four thousand eight hundred 
dollars in arrears during a period outside the statute of 
limitations. Judge Noel then adopted the Commissioner's 
recommendation regarding the credit for S.S.I, payments, finding 
that this offset all but nine hundred eighty-eight dollars of 
respondent's total arrearage. Over respondent's objection, Judge 
Noel then offset this amount against respondent's claimed share 
of equity in the family home, and awarded respondent the 
difference of two thousand eight hundred and twelve dollars. 
Tamara Coulon then brought this appeal. 
C. Statement of Facts Relevant to This Appeal 
Mark and Tamara Coulon were divorced on January 13, 1983. 
R. 19-21. On March 4, 1985, Mark Coulon's equity in the family 
home was reduced to three thousand eight hundred dollars. R. 
66-67. Shortly thereafter, on April 10, 1986, Mark Coulon became 
disabled and qualified for Social Security disability benefits in 
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October, 1986. 
Unable to meet his support obligation because of his 
disability, Mark applied and was approved for S.S.I, disability 
payments for his minor children, which they began receiving in 
November, 1987, From November, 1987 through June, 1994, Tamara 
Coulon received thirty-two thousand six hundred and twelve 
dollars to provide for the children's needs. 
From March, 1985 through June, 1986 (the date of statutory 
limitation in this case to collect a child support arrearage), 
Mark Coulon was obligated to pay four thousand eight hundred 
dollars in child support. From June, 1986 to the date of 
appellant's Counter-Order to Show Cause, Mark Coulon was 
obligated to pay twenty-eight thousand eight hundred dollars in 
child support. 
Summary of the Argument 
The district court judge was within his discretion in 
crediting Mark Coulon's child support arrearage in the amount of 
the Supplemental Security Income payments the children received 
based on Mark Coulon's disability. Although it is true that 
child support payments cannot generally be modified after they 
become due, the district court judge did not modify the payments, 
but instead granted Mark Coulon a credit toward that debt. This 
court has allowed such credits in other similar cases. 
Moreover, the purpose of Supplemental Security Income 
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payments to children of a disabled person is to provide for the 
children during a period in which the wage earner, by definition, 
is unable to so provide. The Utah Legislature and Utah courts 
recognize that a parent is not always able to provide for 
children after a divorce, and thus predicate child support 
payments not only on the children's needs, but also on the 
parent's ability to pay. This case is accordingly 
distinguishable from cases involving other types of public 
assistance, in that the payments to Mark Coulon's children 
through S.S.I, were intended to take the place of his salary 
during the period in which he could not provide for his children. 
In addition, Tamara Coulon, Mark's ex-wife, accepted the 
disability payments and did not pursue the child support 
arrearage. Since she is not seeking reimbursement for expenses 
she wrongfully incurred, nor is she claiming that the children 
were not adeguately provided for (since the disability payments 
in fact exceeded Mark Coulon's monthly child support obligation), 
Utah precedent makes clear that she should be estopped from 
claiming the child support arrearage. 
Argument 
I. IT WAS WITHIN THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE'S DISCRETION TO 
CREDIT THE COULON CHILDREN'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISABILITY 
PAYMENTS TOWARD MARK COULON'S CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGE. 
This Court should affirm the trial judges's decision to 
grant Mark Coulon a credit toward his 'child support arrearage 
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because that decision is adequately supported by precedent in 
Utah and was thus within the trial judge's discretion. Appellant 
misconstrues the nature of the trial judge's ruling by 
characterizing it as a "modification" of the divorce decree. 
See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 11. 
What the trial judge in fact did was recognize Mark Coulon's 
obligation for his child support arrearage, and then grant him a 
credit toward that debt in the amount of the S.S.I, disability 
payments made to his children in his behalf. See Minute Entry of 
Judge Frank G. Noel, April 6, 1995 (establishing child support 
debt, and then granting "credit" against that debt). This is 
more than a semantic difference, and it is a difference that has 
been recognized in controlling Utah cases. 
For example, in Cumminqs v. Cumminqs, 821 P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991), this Court held that a father could not obtain relief 
from a child support arrearage for periods in which the children 
had lived with him, observing that "retroactive relief from child 
support obligations is generally not allowed." Id. at 480. 
Nevertheless, the court went on to observe that the mother "also 
contends that the trial court erred in reducing [the father's] 
child support arrearage by the amount he paid for medical 
expenses and insurance premiums for the children. We affirm this 
deduction . . . ." Id. at 481 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Utah Department of Social Services v. Adams, 
806 P.2d 1193 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), the state challenged a 
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father's claim to have satisfied his child support obligation by-
providing rent-free housing to his ex-wife and children. Id. at 
1195. Holding that the father had satisfied his child support 
obligation by providing housing, the court observed that "[n]° 
modification of substantive obligations under the divorce decree 
occurred. Defendant [the father] was relieved of no support 
obligations; no support arrearage or future obligation was 
compromised." Id. at 1196. As in the aforementioned cases, Mark 
Coulon was simply granted a credit toward an admitted arrearage 
for amounts paid :3n his behalf and used to satisfy the needs of 
his children. 
In comparison, this case is easily distinguishable from 
those involving attempts by a father to offset an arrearage by 
unilaterally making expenditures in his children's behalf. For 
example, in Ross v. Ross, 592 P. 2d 600 (I Jtah .1 979) bhe supreme 
court held that a father was not entitled to a credit against his 
arrearage for amounts he claimed to have given to his parents to 
expend on his children's behalf. Id. at 603-04. The court's 
rationale was that to allow a father to make such unilateral 
decisions would be to "permit [the father] to vary the terms of 
the decree and to usurp from [the mother] the right to determine 
the manner in which the money should be spent. Id. at 603. 
This case does no1 : present the same difficulty. Tamara 
Coulon received a cash payment in Mark Coulon's behalf through 
the Social Security Administration. She was free to spend it as 
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she saw fit to provide for her children's needs. In fact, she 
received an even larger payment on a monthly basis than she would 
have if Mark Coulon had been able to pay his obligation directly. 
Hence, the present case is analogous to the holding of the Court 
in Adams. See Adams, 806 P.2d at 1196. Tamara Coulon is, in 
effect, arguing that she would rather have had Mark Coulon pay 
his child support payment than accept an even larger S.S.I. 
payment made on his behalf due to his inability to work. 
Mark's inability to work, and the nature of the S.S.I. 
payments further suggest the propriety of the district court 
ruling. As this Court noted in Brooks: 
Social security dependent disability benefits replace 
support the child loses upon the disability of the wage 
earner responsible for the child's support, and such 
benefits substitute for a parent's loss of earning 
power and obligation to support his dependents. Thus, 
the source and purpose of social security dependent 
benefits are identical to the source and purpose of 
child support—both come from a noncustodial parent's 
wages or assets and both provide for the needs of the 
dependent child and, for our purposes, "no princip[led] 
distinction exists between social security benefits and 
child support payments." 
Brooks, 881 P.2d at 962 (quoting In re Marriage of Henry, 622 
N.E.2d 803, 809 (111. 1993) (further citation omitted) (emphasis 
added); see Frank S. Bloch, Federal Disability Law and Practice § 
3.1 at 71 (John Wiley & Sons 1984) ("The overriding purpose of 
these provisions for secondary benefits is to provide a source of 
income to those people most likely to have relied on the wage 
earner for support.") 
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Thus, supplemental disability payments are different than 
other types of public assistance, at least in the context of 
child support. For example, in Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 P.2d 1374 
(Utah 1980), the court held that a father was not entitled to 
have his support obligation prospectively reduced based on the 
fact that his child was receiving social security payments for 
her own disability. The court observed that the father "should 
not be permitted to avoid support obligations simply because a 
government agency has been filling them." Id. at 1377. In 
Kiesel, unlike this case, the father was fully capable of meeting 
his support obligation, but petitioned the court to reduce that 
obligation because his child was receiving public assistance 
wholly unrelated to the father's situation. Thus, Kiesel and 
other cases involving general public assistance payments are not 
relevant to the situation before this Court. 
Nor has this situation been before this Court in the past. 
Although, as this court noted in Brooks, some courts have been 
reluctant to credit social security payments toward a child 
support arrearage, see Brooks, 881 P.2d at 961-62, that question 
was not before this Court in Brooks. Nevertheless, the rationale 
adopted in Brooks to justify crediting supplemental disability 
payments toward a prospective support obligation applies with 
equal force to Mark Coulon's situation: the S.S.I, payments to 
his children were intended to replace his support during the 
period of his disability. In fact, only the motivation to punish 
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Mark Coulon for failing to seek prospective relief could justify 
treating Mark Coulon differently from the father in Brooks. 
Mark Coulon does not merit such censure. Faced with a 
disability which prevented him from working and providing for his 
children, he saw to it that his children were provided for in 
conjunction with his disability benefit. He actually secured for 
them a larger payment than they would have been entitled to if 
Mark had been working. 
In fact, Mark's disability would have been an adequate 
ground to have his obligation formally modified had he sought 
such relief. Despite the paramount concern for the needs of the 
children, a court is also bound to consider a parent's ability to 
pay when making a child support determination. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45-7(3)(c) (1995) (requiring court to consider "ability 
of the obligor to earn" when setting support outside guidelines); 
Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262, 1267-68 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (finding 
that where father was disabled, income should not be imputed to 
him under child support guidelines). Hence, the c[uestion before 
this court is whether, in an equitable proceeding, it would be 
fair to allow Tamara Coulon to recover nearly thirty thousand 
dollars from Mark Coulon after receiving more than that amount in 
Mark's behalf, and all to punish Mark for failing to petition the 
court for a modification of his decree. The answer to that 
question is, of course, that it would be grossly inequitable to 
suggest such a result. This court should hold that the district 
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court judge was within his discretion to grant Mark Coulon the 
credit against his arrearage. 
II. TAMARA COULON SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THE CHILD 
SUPPORT ARREARAGE AND THAT ESTOPPEL IS AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR 
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION. 
Since Tamara Coulon accepted the disability payments and is 
not now asking to be reimbursed for expenses she was wrongfully 
forced to bear, nor claiming that the children were not provided 
for, she should be estopped from claiming Mark Coulon's child 
support arrearage. In Wasecha v. Wasecha, 548 P.2d 895 (Utah 
1976), a mother petitioned to recover a child support arrearage, 
alleging that she wanted to recover the money to "place[] in 
trust for the benefit of the children to help them with further 
education or living, whatever their needs may be." Id. at 896 
(italics omitted). The children had been supported by the mother 
and her second husband during the period in which the arrearage 
accumulated, but the mother explicitly disavowed that she was 
seeking reimbursement. Id. at 895-96. The Utah Supreme Court 
held that the mother was estopped from recovering the arrearage, 
observing that: 
There is no prayer for reimbursement for past support 
under such conditions, but there seems to be an 
admission that the children's right to support amply 
was supplied by someone, which would eliminate their 
claim for support or, if you please, double support, 
and which admission would seem to be an abandonment of 
a parent's claim for reimbursement, and certainly an 
estoppel to assert am antithetical claim for past child 
support . . . . 
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Id, at 896. Summarizing, the Wasecha Court announced that if a 
claim for support "has been satisfied by one not claiming 
reimbursement nor by one claiming the children were denied the 
right, it is no longer subject to double sale by double talk or 
flight from equity." Id. 
The Wasecha holding applies with even greater force here 
than it did to its own facts. In Wasecha, the mother herself had 
provided for the children during the period in which the father 
failed to make payments. Here, in contrast, Tamara Coulon has 
not simply foregone a claim for reimbursement, she cannot claim 
reimbursement because she has not suffered any loss. Moreover, 
the father in Wasecha did not have even a tenuous connection to 
the support provided his children during the period in which the 
arrearage accumulated. Here, Mark Coulon's children were 
provided for precisely because Mark could not do so himself, and 
it was Mark Coulon who saw to it that the support was provided. 
Accordingly, this Court should hold that Tamara Coulon is 
estopped from claiming the child support arrearage. Since there 
is an adequate legal basis for the trial court's ruling, this 
Court must affirm the trial court's ruling even though estoppel 
was not argued below. 
Conclusion 
Utah precedent recognizes that credits may be granted 
against child support arrearage under appropriate circumstances, 
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and this case is an example of a situation in which a credit was 
appropriately granted. Mark Coulon became disabled and was thus 
unable to meet his support obligation. He petitioned for 
disability benefits not only for himself, but for his children as 
well. The children were provided for in Mark's behalf, and the 
trial judge was accordingly within his discretion in allowing the 
credit. This court should not disturb that exercise of 
discretion. 
Additionally, Tamara Coulon should be estopped from claiming 
the arrearage. She is not claiming that she is entitled to 
reimbursement, nor is she claiming that the children's needs were 
not provided. Thus, Utah precedent is clear that her claim for 
the arrearage cannot be sustained, and this alone is sufficient 
to reguire this Court to affirm the ruling below. 
DATED this \ * day of September, 1995. 
( HAWKINS & ASSOCIATES //~) 
4AMES c. RASKINS 
Attorney/ for 
Appellee/Defendant 
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